Before anyone jumps to the wrong conclusion, John Hurst is no free-loader. He is a highly responsible and patriotic citizen, a former police officer with an impressive record. His decision not to pay is based on thorough research indicating that councils have no legal right whatsoever to levy such a tax on its citizens. Believing this to be true, John would have therefore committed an offence by actually paying the tax, as the majority of us already have. Given that ignorance of the law is no defence, it places the overwhelming majority of hitherto respectable British citizens in an invidious situation and the courts in an even worse one.

John, a committed supporter of Lawful Rebellion, arrived at the court with his wife, along with her Mackenzie Friend. The court official took down the details but then returned some time later stating that Tina Hurst’s case was no longer listed. This was an extremely odd development, given that Tina is registered disabled with visual impairment and would have hence qualified for a Council Tax rebate, which had not been awarded and for legal aid should she decide to take the case further. It would appear that suspicions of skulduggery would not be entirely unfounded. The official was challenged over this and shortly afterwards brought out a more senior figure, a pleasant young man, who invited the little party into a private office. There he declared that on checking his information, Tina Hurst was on the list after all!

Much later, the group was invited into Court. John Hurst, representing himself, immediately questioned as to why there were only two magistrates on the bench instead of the required three. The Council`s solicitor stated that he had to agree but that this was not contentious. John immediately retorted that it was and insisted on exercising his legal right to have three magistrates present. The court officials had to concede and the group was asked to leave the Court whilst a third magistrate be found.

Amongst John Hurst’s contentions, was the fact that this court had no jurisdiction to make a firm decision on his case. Therefore, it was welcome when the council solicitor appeared, telling John that the court had decided that the matter should be passed to the Court in Llandrindod Wells for trial on Friday 5th November at ten a.m.

The group re-entered the Court shortly afterwards for the formal decision to be announced, but John consequently and successfully challenged the by now hapless and bewildered clerk of the court over a number of legal and procedural issues.

It was not all over, as John stated that he had not yet received disclosure of the Council`s documents. The Council`s solicitor conceded that they had only been posted on 29th September, two days earlier. The clerk then stated that in order to enable Counsel to examine the Hurst’s skeleton argument, the time of the coming hearing would be delayed by thirty minutes. John immediately stated that he failed to understand how this would allow Counsel to assimilate the information as it consisted of thirty pages. The clerk again seemed baffled by this, as she was unaware of this attachment. The Council`s solicitor was immediately questioned and became somewhat incoherent. He asked if John had actually sent the documents with the attachment, to the Council. John stated that he had and furthermore had a printed e-mail acknowledgement from the Council to prove it.

Hence, it was established that the Council`s solicitor must have knowingly or recklessly failed to disclose vital evidence to the Court, a criminal offence.

The Court was hastily concluded and the officials and the solicitor were assured that a formal complaints would be issued, including one to the police requesting the arrest and charge of Powys Council`s solicitor for withholding evidence from the Court, which, moreover, would have not have been discovered but for the unfortunate clerk`s statement.

It must be said that John Hurst`s performance in Court was magnificent, assured, authoritative and knowledgeable at all times, invariably leaving the court, including the magistrates, trailing along hopelessly out of their collective depth. He and his wife deserve every possible support for their courageous stand, which is an important stepping stone on the way to exposing the inefficiency, unlawful conduct and even possible corruption on the part of those responsible for administering our legal system and the behaviour of other state-funded officials, particularly in this instance, those employed by Powys Council.

This court report was originally written by journalist Robert Green.

read comments at pjc journal link below

http://pjcjournal.wordpress.com/2010/10/10/council-tax-rebellion-and-a-day-in-court/

Council Tax rebellion – John Hurst StatementPosted on October 11, 2010 by Ian Parker-Joseph

Following the court report published yesterday, John Hurst has issued the following Statement for publication:

So much for the events at Court. The significance of this case to us all is the reason why a local authority, or any other revenue gathering body, no longer has lawful authority to tax us. It is because The Crown, and all officials who act in the name of the Crown, have breached the contract with the people of these islands to rule us according to our laws and customs.

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That contract was acknowledged in the peace treaties know as Magna Carta and the Declaration of Rights. The present Queen publicly swore to uphold those laws and customs at her Coronation in 1953. In 2009 she gave Royal Assent to the unlawful pretended statute which gave effect to the Lisbon treaty and allowed foreign potentates of the European Union to issue directives and regulations which her officials then impose as if they had the authority of Parliament.

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From that moment the UK changed from a constitutional monarchy to a tyranny, and we were subjected to the abuse of the state’s coercive force in the absence of the rule of law.
This is not the first time this has happened in history and our ancestors successfully resisted using our common law right to the protection of duress of circumstances confirmed in Chapter 61 of Magna Carta.

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The “Skeleton Argument” that is before the Court explains what is at stake:

i. The respondent resides in a rented cottage in Powys and the Claimant has presented him with a bill for Council Tax for £900 in the name of The Queen.

ii. The Respondent has made a conditional offer to pay if the claimant can produce evidence that the claim is made lawfully. In the absence of such evidence, he is asserting that breaches of treaty obligations between The Crown and the people and the activation of the procedure specified by Ch. 61 of Magna Carta 1215 and, alternatively, the Common Law defence of duress of circumstances justify his withholding of the payment.

iii. The first matter at issue is the authority of The Queen (and Her officials) to issue demands for taxes at a time when she is under the supervision of a Barons Committee lawfully constituted under Ch. 61 of Magna Carta 1215. If the demand was made in the name of a Corporation and not The Queen then the Respondent has no contract with them and therefore no liability.

iv. The second matter at issue, which the Respondent alternatively and independently relies on, is the Common Law right of the subject to invoke the defence of duress of circumstances because The Queen has breached her Common Law treaty obligations with the people that were confirmed in Magna Carta 1215 and the Declaration of Rights 1688 and as a consequence the Respondents life, liberties and property are threatened.

i. The respondent has been a legal researcher for the Magna Carta Society (the MCS) since 1998 and helped produce the research paper on the possibility of raising a Barons Committee in 1999.

ii. Michael Burke, also a member of the society, petitioned the Courts to uphold the Declaration and Bill of Rights in 1998 and 1999 without success. The Judgments were referred to in the research paper and were part of the material relied upon in its arguments.

iii. Members of the public were invited to send postcards to The Queen urging her not to give Royal Assent to any statute which purported to give effect to the Nice Treaty in the UK. Several hundred thousand did so.

iv. The Queen failed to respond to public petitioning and there was no evidence that the then Prime Minister intended to change his counsels.

v. Members of the society petitioned each member of the Houses of Lords and Commons not to give their support to any statute relating to the Nice Treaty.

vi. 65 Peers selected a quorum of 25 of their number to address the petitions from the MCS and members of the public. They were satisfied that the conditions required to justify the use of the procedure specified in Ch. 61 of Magna Carta 1215 were established. Four of their number served the petition on Her Majesty on 7th February 2001.

vii. No response was made to the Barons Petition within the specified 40 days or has been to date. The conditions for Lawful Rebellion came into effect.

viii. The then Government used a purported statute (the House of Lords Act 1999) and the Rules of Parliament to deny a majority of the Hereditary Peers access to the House which prevented them exercising their Common Law right to be consulted about and vote on statutes. Officials took possession of their Letters Patent. They were replaced by hereditary Peers, many in dubious circumstances (the cash for Peerages scandal).

ix. The Queen gave Royal Assent to a purported statute giving effect to the Nice Treaty on 26/2/2002.

x. The Queen gave Royal Assent to a purported statute giving effect to the Lisbon Treaty on 19/06/2008. Direct rule from the European Union commenced in late 2009.

xi. Displaced hereditary Peers challenged the validity of the House of Lords Act and obtained an admission that it was invalid from a Government Minister, Baroness Ashton, on 20th September 2008. To date, no remedial action has been taken. This is described in the submission listed at Para 4. i. Above.

1. The Respondents Submissions Opposing a Liability Order.

i. I am a British subject of good character and have twice sworn the Oath of Allegiance, as a soldier and as a police officer. Both of those oaths require allegiance to the law, not an office holder, and require the individual concerned to make judgments about the lawfulness of his, or her, actions. So does the Judicial Oath.

ii. Regarding Ch. 61 of Magna Carta, I submit that a Baron’s Committee was lawfully raised, that their Petition was served on The Queen on 7th February 2001 and that the provisions of Ch. 61 of Magna Carta 1215 apply until the Committee or a duly constituted Constitutional Convention decides otherwise. I have sworn allegiance to that Committee. In these circumstances I submit that Powys Council has no authority to issue a tax demand to me.

iii. Regarding the defence of “duress of circumstances”, I have an honestly held belief that my life, liberty and property are at risk because laws that are repugnant to the Common Law are being applied within the UK. I did not place myself voluntarily in this position. Refusing to pay taxes to The Queen, who, together with certain evil counsellors, is responsible for this situation and is in breach of the Common Law and her Coronation Oath is an act of self defence on my part. Any refusal by Crown Officials to acknowledge the restraints that they are subject to will be further evidence that my beliefs are well founded.

iv. The Judicial Studies Board document referred to at Para. 3. iv. above confirms that it is for The Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt the defence of duress does not apply.

2. Remedies Sought by the Respondent.

i. For the reasons given above I respectfully submit that no properly directed Court has authority to try me for refusing to pay Council Tax. If the Brecon Magistrates are unable to make a ruling on this I claim my right to have the issues that I have raised put before a lawfully constituted (complete with all hereditary Peers and without post 1999 Life Peers) House of Lords in order for a case to be stated. That is because the defects in the House of Lords Act 1999 noted above call into doubt the validity of the new “Supreme Court”.

ii. If the Brecon Magistrates are unable to do that I ask for these matters to be put before the Supreme Court for a case to be stated. I reserve the right to challenge the validity of that Court for the reasons given.

Respectfully submitted,

John Hurst.

As reported yesterday, the Brecon court has decided that the matter should be passed to the Court in Llandrindod Wells for for a new hearing on Friday 5th November at ten a.m, and I am sure that John would welcome support.

(note: it is not a trial, but a hearing before an administrative court which is hired for the day by the Council, including the magistrates).